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The Torch Dims: The Ambiguity of Asylum and
the "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution"
Standard in Sadeghi v. INS
I. Introduction
The Statue of Liberty stands tall on Liberty Island in New York
Harbor as a beacon of refuge for immigrants: "Give me your tired,
your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free," the Statue
reads. Howeverj for those most in need of protection today, the dream
is strangled in the U.S. system ofjustice. Immigrants seeking to escape
persecution in their homeland and attain asylum in the United States
encounter difficulty in establishing their claim due to inconsistent
court interpretations of what constitutes persecution. In Sadeghi v.
INS,1 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted a petition for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) final deportation
order and denial of application of asylum for Ebrahim Sadeghi The
court focused on the deferential "substantial evidence" standard of review of BIA decisions as it evaluated whether Sadeghi had established
of a "well-founded fear of persecution" in his homesufficient proof
2
land of Iran.
The Tenth Circuit, in a two to one decision, affirmed the BIA's
denial of Sadeghi's asylum claim. 3 The court determined that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that Sadeghi had failed to
prove his status as a refugee for purposes of asylum. 4 In the majority
opinion, Judge Tacha deferred to the factual findings of the BIA in
affirming that Sadeghi had failed to meet the burden of proving that
he had a "well-founded fear" of persecution. 5 Judge Tacha specifically
relied on BIA and case law distinctions between political persecution
and legitimate criminal prosecution in concluding that the BIA "reasonably could have inferred" that the Iranian government's attempted
arrest and its placement of Sadeghi on a "wanted" list was6 based on a
legitimate criminal prosecution for illegal activity in Iran.
Judge Kane, Senior DistrictJudge of the U.S. District Court for the
1 40 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 1994).
2 Id. at 1142-43.
3 Id. at 1143.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1142.
6 Id.
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District of Colorado, sitting by designation, dissented from the majority opinion. 7 Judge Kane, using the same substantial evidence standard of review, found the BIA's determination that Sadeghi had failed
to establish a "well-founded fear of persecution" to be unreasonable
and unsupported by the evidence.8 The dissent focused on the BIA's
assumptions regarding the law of Iran, which served as the basis for its
determination that Sadeghi's only fear was of a legitimate criminal
prosecution by the Iranian government. 9
This Note will explore the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the "wellfounded fear" standard and its deferential review of the BIA decision.
Part II will discuss the facts and holding of Sadeghi v. INS. The background law will be examined in Part III, and Part IV will provide an
analysis of the court's opinion. Finally this Note will conclude that the
court's deference to the BIA's decision impedes its own analysis of asylum requirements, leaving future asylum applicants with a vague interpretation of persecution and an unprotected Ebrahim Sadeghi in fear
for his life.
II. The Facts of Sadeghi and the Tenth Circuit's Decision
Ebrahim Sadeghi is an Iranian national who returned to Iran in
August 1982 after furthering his education in France for several
years. 10 Sadeghi discovered upon his return that Iran was being governed under Islamic principles.11 Despite his anti-Islamic views, he obtained a teaching job through a former student who worked with the
Islamic government.1 2 Sadeghi neither advocated nor fully concealed
his anti-Islamic views from his students, and only vocalized his true sentiments when a fourteen-year-old student told him he was going to
fight in the Iraqi war to become a "martyr for God."1 3 Sadeghi believes
that after he begged the student not to enlist, the student reported
him to the government authorities. 14 In April 1983, four armed members of the national guard came to the school to arrest Sadeghi "be15
cause he was against the government and the Islamic revolution."
Sadeghi escaped through a side door, did not return home, and fled to
France. 16 He entered the United States as a visitor on April 8, 1988,
and overstayed his visa." In June of 1989, Sadeghi was served with an
7 Id. at 1140, 1143.
8 Id. at 1144 (Kane J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 1145 (KaneJ., dissenting).
10 Id. at 1140-41.
11 Id. at 1141.
12
13
14
15
16

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 1144.
Id.

17 Id. at 1140.
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order to show cause alleging his deportability. 18 Conceding deportability, Sadeghi requested asylum and withholding of
deportation. 19
The case was heard before an immigration judge. 20 The evidence
provided by Sadeghi to establish his "well-founded fear of persecution"
included the following: his own testimony that he is a member of an
anti-government group called the National Movement of the Iranian
Resistance (NAMIR); evidence presented by two former members of
the Iranian military that Sadeghi's name appeared on a list of individuals wanted by the Iranian government; a letter submitted from a former Iranian military officer, corroborating that Sadeghi's name was on
a list of wanted persons; an affidavit from a former student verifying
the April 1983 incident and current presence of Sadeghi's name on a
wanted list, definitively stating that Sadeghi would be subjected to persecution because of his political beliefs if he were to return to Iran; and
a letter from NAMIR stating that all Iranians fleeing the country because of their anti-governmental activities would face imprisonment or
death upon return and that such treatment was a serious possibility if
Sadeghi returned to Iran.2 1 Although the immigration judge found
Sadeghi's evidence to be credible, and believed that he had a legitimate fear of returning to Iran, the judge determined that Sadeghi's
fear was a fear of prosecution for opposing his student's service in the
Iraqi war, rather than a fear of persecution.2 2 The immigration judge
therefore denied the application for asylum, and withholding of
23
deportation.
The BIA denied Sadeghi's appeal on two grounds. First, it agreed
that Sadeghi had failed to prove that the Iranian government's attempt
to arrest him was based on an intent to persecute.2 4 In the alternative,
the BIA based its denial of appeal on its finding, contrary to the affirmative credibility holding of the immigration judge, that Sadeghi's evidence establishing a fear of persecution was weak and not fully
25
credible.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the BIA's findings to
determine whether they were "supported by reasonable, substantial
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole."2 6 The
majority concluded that Sadeghi's placement on a government
"wanted" list resulted from the counseling of his student not to fight in
the Iraqi ;var, an "act which the BIA reasonably could have inferred was
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 I.

21 Id. at 1141.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1141-42.
24 Id. at 1142.
25 Id.

26 Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (4) (1988).
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illegal in Iran." 27 Judge Tacha rejected BIA precedent in holding that
the burden to prove the content and interpretation of foreign law was
on the petitioner.2 8 Therefore, because Sadeghi had failed to prove
that counseling against conscription in the Iranian armed forces was a
legal activity in Iran, the majority upheld the BIA's conclusion that the
government authorities who arrived at Sadeghi's school in 1983 were
attempting to effect a legitimate arrest.2 9 Based on this determination,
the majority deferred to the BIA's denial of Sadeghi's application for
asylum.3 0 Judge Tacha found it unnecessary to address whether the
BIA properly reversed the immigration judge's determination of the
credibility of Sadeghi's evidence, or whether Sadeghi had met the
31
tougher standard for withholding of deportation.
Although Judge Kane's dissenting opinion applied the same substantial evidence standard to evaluate the BIA's denial of refugee status
for Sadeghi, the dissent's review of the BIA decision substantially differed from that of the majority. 32 Judge Kane found the BIA decision
to be "conspicuously flawed" and "utterly lacking in justice."33 Judge
Kane criticized the BIA's "presuppositionless conclusion" that the Iranian government's attempt to arrest Sadeghi represented a legitimate
criminal prosecution. 3 4 The dissent further criticized the majority and
the BIA for violating its own precedent, which placed the burden of
proof of foreign law on the party who relies on it.3 5 Judge Kane would
have held the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) responsible for proving the existence of Iranian laws that make counseling
against conscription illegal. 36 The dissent then attacked the second
ground of the BIA decision, which found weaknesses in Sadeghi's evidence.3 7 Judge Kane denounced this BIA determination as "fundamentally unfair" in light of the fact that the immigration judge cut off
Sadeghi's testimony, satisfied that he faced persecution upon -return to
Iran.38 Judge Kane would have reversed the BIA's denial of asylum
eligibility and would have held that Sadeghi met the requirements for
asylum and the more stringent standard for withholding of
deportation. 9
27 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1142.
28 Id. at 1143.
29 Id. at 1142.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1143.
32 See id. at 1144.

33 Id. at 1143.
34 Id. at 1146 (Kane, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 1145 (Kane, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 1146 (Kane, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 1147 (Kane, J., dissenting).
38 Id. (Kane, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 1147-48 (Kane, J., dissenting).
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III. Background Law
A.

U.S. Refugee Law Changes to Conform with InternationalLaw

In 1980, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952.40 "[ O]ne of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United
States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 1 . .. to which the United
States acceded in 1968."42 Compliance with substantive provisions of
the United Nations Protocol mandates that contracting States not return an alien to a country "where his life or freedom would be
threatened." 43 The 1967 Protocol also imposed a more discretionary
duty to "facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees."44
Congressional interpretation of the 1967 Protocol provisions resulted
in two methods of relief for an alien, who, within U.S. boundaries,
claims persecution upon return to his home country. 4 5 These two
methods of relief are withholding of deportation and asylum. 4 6
Prior to 1980, the Attorney General had discretion to withhold
deportation under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. 47 To comply with the United Nations Protocol, the 1980 Act removed the Attorney General's discretion in section 243(h) withholding of deportation proceedings and created a mandatory entitlement
to relief for an alien who demonstrates that his "life or freedom would
be threatened" due to race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 4 8 In 1NS v. Stevic,49 the
Supreme Court interpreted the "would be threatened" language as
40 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
41 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268.
42 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (citing H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979); S. REP. No. 256,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); H.R. CONF. REP. No.
781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980)).
43 Id. at 429 n.7 (quoting 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (1954), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6278, T.IAS.
No. 6577 (1968)).
44 Id. at 441 (quoting United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, art. 34, 189 U.N.T.S. 150).
45 See id. at 424.
The Act's establishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be deported to the country where they are in danger, mirrors
the provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act of

1980.
Id.
46 See id.
47 Id. at 429.
48 Id. Section 243(h) provides: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any
alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion." Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L.
No. 414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 166, 213 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
49 467 U.S. 407 (1987).
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providing a purely objective standard with no subjective component.
Therefore, the alien must demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution" through objective evidence that persecution is "more likely than
not" in order to be entitled to relief under withholding of deportation
50
section 243(h).
The Refugee Act of 1980 also established the procedure for asylum under section. 208(a). 5 1 Asylum itself is a two-step process.52 First,
the alien must establish his status as a "refugee," as defined in section
1101(a) (42) of the 1980 Refugee Act.5 3 Once the Attorney General
determines that the alien meets that statutory definition of refugee,
then the "alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General."5 4 Since this second step to the asylum process is purely
definition of refugee,
discretionary, even if an alien meets the statutory
55
the Attorney General may still deny asylum.
The determination of refugee status for the process of asylum
under section 208(a) of the Refugee Act carries a less stringent test
than the "clear probability of persecution" standard for mandatory relief of withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.5 6 A "refugee" for asylum purposes is
defined as an alien unable to return to his country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion . . . . 57 The Supreme Court in Stevic labeled this statutory
50 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987). The 1967 Protocol applies a liberal construction of "refugee," emphasizing the individual statement of the applicant. Theodore N. Cox, Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted: The Sources and Application of a Criterionof
Refugee Status, 10 BRooK. J. INT'L L. 333, 375-76 (1984). Accordingly, the "clear probability
standard.., is fundamentally inconsistent with the Protocol definition of refugee both in its
formulation and application." Id.
51 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427. Section 208(a), introduced in the 1980 Act,
provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present
in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that
such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a) (42) (A) of this
title.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988)).
52 Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 427-28.
53 Id. at 428.
54 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
55 Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 428 n.5.
56 Id. at 443-50. Accord INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428-30 (1984).
57 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1988). This statutory definition of the term "refugee"
that Congress adopted is "virtually identical" to the definition provided in the 1967 United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 437. Indeed,
the legislative history demonstrates "that the definition was accepted 'with the understanding
that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol.'" Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 20 (1980); see also HR. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980)).
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definition as the "well-founded fear" test for asylum. 58 However, in INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court declined to develop further that test, leaving it to future case-by-case adjudication to give the term "well-founded
fear" concrete meaning. 59 The courts of appeals "have interpreted the
well-founded fear of persecution standard to require a subjective 'fear'
component and an objective 'well-founded' component."60
The objective part of the test is satisfied by direct and specific evidence in the record "of facts that would support a reasonable fear that
the petitioner faces persecution." 61 The alien is required to make an
"individualized showing" that he is directly threatened by the government in his home country. 62 "[C]ourts have consistently rejected applications for political asylum based on fear grounded in general
violence or unrest in one's native country." 63 For example, in M.A. v.
INS,64 the petitioner claimed that his refusal to serve in the El Salvadoran military would subject him to persecution upon return. However,
the Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding "no evidence whatsoever that
either the government or the guerrillas have a particular interest in
him," but rather a state of general violence "incidental to the civil war
in El Salvador." 65 However, it is not necessary to establish that the
alien would be singled out for persecution if "there is a pattern or practice of persecution of groups similarly situated . . . ."66 General information on conditions in a country can be relevant when used to
67
support specific information relating to the alien's well-founded fear.
The principal issue for the court's determination "is whether
th[e] subjective fear has a sufficient objective basis." 68 Documentary
evidence is not necessary, but rather the alien's own testimony, if credible, can be sufficient to support an application for asylum. 69 Once
such an objective showing is made, the alien must only show his fear to
58 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 408. The Steuic case only addressed the "clear probability" standard
for withholding of deportation. Id. at 429. The Court did "not decide the meaning of the
phrase 'well-founded fear of persecution.' " Id.
59 Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 448. This "well-founded fear of being persecuted" standard is the key criterion to obtaining refugee status under the 1967 Protocol. Cox, supra
note 50, at 333-34.
60 Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 706 (10th Cir. 1991).
61 Id. (quoting Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990)); accordM.Av.
INS, 899 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
62 Refahiyat v. INS, 29 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1994); accord Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d
1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985).
63 M.A., 899 F.2d at 315.
64 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
65 Id. (emphasis added).
66 Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1031 (2d Cir. 1994); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2) (i) (A)-(B)
(1994).
67 Ganjour v. INS, 796 F.2d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 1986).
68 Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990).
69 Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1988). "Persecutors are hardly likely
to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution." Aguiera-Cota,
914 F.2d at 1380 (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984));
accord Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1994).
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be genuine in order to satisfy the subjective component. 70 For example, in Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 71 the petitioner worked as a government
employee in El Salvador during the 1983-84 elections. 72 Aguilera received a threatening note and a few days later a stranger came to his
house looking for him, questioning Aguilera's sister about Aguilera's
government employment. 73 Soon thereafter, Aguilera fled to the
United States. 74 The Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA holding that the
petitioner was ineligible for asylum, holding that "Aguilera's testimony
concerning the',threatening note and the. visit by a,stranger shortly
thereafter constitute [d] 'specific evidence' sufficient to 'support a reasonable fear that the petitioner faces persecution.' ,,75 The Court
stated that if an alien's testimony regarding a threat, when unrefuted
and credible, was insufficient because of a lack of direct corroborative
evidence, it "would be close to impossible for any political refugee to
76
make out a case for asylum."
B.

Circuit Court Standard of Review of Agency Decisions

The Immigration and Nationality Act declares that BIA "findings
of facts, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence
on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive." 77 Therefore, the courts of appeals must uphold BIA factual findings regarding
asylum eligibility under section 208(a), or withholding of deportation
under section 243(h), if supported by reasonable and substantial evidence. 78 Although the courts review only BIA conclusions, and not
those of the immigration judge, the courts of appeals "should accord
the findings of the trial examiner the relevance that they reasonably
command in answering the comprehensive question whether the evi79
dence supporting the Board's order is substantial."
The substantial evidence standard specifically applies to the BIA
determination of whether the alien has established refugee status. 80
The asylum applicant bears the burden of presenting specific evidence
"to prove either past persecution or 'good reason' to fear future persecution."8 1 The courts of appeals do not weigh the evidence or evaluate
70 Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 706 (10th Cir. 1991).

71 914 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990).
72 Id. at 1378.

73 Id.
74 Id.

75 Id. at 1379 (quoting Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1988).
76 Id.
77 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1988).

78 Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir. 1994).
79 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 497 (1951); accord Cardoza-Fonseca
v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
80 Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 707 (10th Cir. 1991).
81 Id. (quoting Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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witness credibility.8 2 Even had the court disagreed with the BIA's conclusions, the BIA's determination that Sadeghi was not eligible for asylum could have been reversed only if the evidence would have
compelled a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the requisite fear
83
of persecution existed.
The courts of appeals review de novo BIA legal interpretations.8 4
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council85 established the principle of substantial deference to agency interpretations of statutory law. Court review of an
agency's construction of a statute depends on whether Congress directly addresses the issue in question. 86 According to Chevron, if congressional intent is clear, the agency, as well as the reviewing court,
"must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."8 7 However, even if the court determines that the issue has not
been directly addressed by Congress, "the court does not simply impose its own construction on the. statute."88 Because of the express
delegation of congressional authority to the agency, the Supreme
Court held that administrative interpretations of statutory law are "accorded controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."8 9 However, "[t]he judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to congressional intent."9 0
Therefore, the courts of appeals will reverse only an unreasonable BIA
interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 9 1
Just nine months before the Tenth Circuit deferred to the BIA
conclusions in Sadeghi, the Second Circuit exercised its final authority
on both factual and statutory interpretation issues in Osorio v. INS.92 In
that case, Vincente Osorio, a citizen of Guatemala, was a leader of the
Central Municipal Workers Union. 93 In that capacity, Osorio negotiated with the municipal government and organized demonstrations
and strikes. 94 The union protests resulted in several acts of violence
95
against union members, including assassinations and kidnappings.
Osorio also organized a mass media campaign, in which he accused
82 Id. (following the standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706

(1992)).
83 INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); accord Kapcia, 944 F.2d at 707.
84 Kapcia, 944 F.2d at 705.
85 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
86 Id. at 842.
87 Id. at 843.
88 Id.

89 Id. at 843-44.
90 Id: at 843 n.9.
91 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987).
92 18 F.3d 1017 (2d Cir. 1994).
93 Id at 1023.
94 Id.

95 Id. at 1023-24.
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the government of human rights abuses, including the violence against
union members.9 6 Osorio then received two anonymous notes con97
taining threats of violence and death against him and his family.
98
The BIA dismissed
Osorio and his wife then fled Guatemala.
Osorio's plea for asylum because it found that he had failed to demonstrate that his fear of persecution was based on one of the enumerated
statutory grounds.9 9 Specifically, the BIA found that because "the fundamental nature of their dispute was economic, concerning wages and
the reinstatement of workers," there was no political motive underlying
the government's actions. 100
Despite the court's application of the deferential review standard,
the Second Circuit rejected both the BIA's factual findings regarding
persecution and its interpretation of "political asylum." 10 1 The court
determined that "the BIA must have assumed that if a dispute is properly characterized as economic, it cannot be characterized as political."10 2 The court found such an assumption to be erroneous because
"where an applicant fears persecution for both his political and economic beliefs, nothing . . .precludes a finding that the applicant is

eligible for political asylum." 10 3 Therefore, the court held that the
BIA's factual conclusions regarding Osorio's persecution were not
"reasonably supported by substantial evidence" and that its "interpretathe plain language and congrestion of political asylum contradicts
10 4
sional intent of the Act."
C.

The Issue of Persecution v. Prosecution

Whether the standard of proof is a "clear probability" or a "wellfounded fear," the Refugee Act defines the parameters of persecution
for purposes of asylum and withholding of deportation. 10 5 Such persecution must be based on the alien's "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 10 6 It is a
well-settled tenet of international law that the enforcement of the internal laws of a nation remains a sovereign right of that nation's gov96 Id.

97 Id. at 1025.
98 Id.

99 Id. at 1028.

100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.

103 Id. "The plain meaning of the phrase 'persecution on account of the victim's political opinion,' does not mean persecution solely on account of the victim's political opinion."
Id. To demonstrate the Board of Immigration Appeal's erroneous view, the court used the
example of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who would not have been eligible for asylum since his
dispute with the former Soviet Union was properly characterized as literary, rather than political. Id. at 1028-29.
104 Id. at 1031.

105 MA v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
106 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
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ernment.10 7 Therefore, prosecution for activities that have been
declared illegal by a sovereign government "is not persecution and
'does not implicate any grounds for asylum.' "108 Therefore, an alien
seeking asylum, who has committed crimes in his home country, cannot introduce the punishment he may receive for those acts as evidence of persecution.109
This principle is uncontroverted among the courts of appeals'
holdings.1 1 0 The Third Circuit applied this principle in its rejection of
a Polish alien's claim that his violation'of Polahd's passport law would
subject him to persecution if returned. 1 1' The court held that prosecution for a criminal violation of fairly administered laws by the Polish
government does not constitute one of the five statutory bases for eligibility of asylum. 112 The Tenth Circuit similarly relied on this tenet to
affirm a BIA conclusion that conviction and fine for distribution of
illegal material "is a legitimate government act and not persecution as
contemplated by the [Immigration and Nationality] Act." 113 The

Fourth Circuit specifically applied this distinction between political
persecution and legitimate prosecution to laws of conscription in M.A.
v. INS.114 In that case, the asylum applicant, who had resisted the draft
into the Salvadoran military, claimed that his refusal to serve would
result in his persecution if he returned to El Salvador.'1 5 The court
declared that "[i]nternational law and BIA precedent are very clear
that a sovereign nation enjoys the right to enforce its laws of conscrip16
tion and that penalties for evasion are not considered persecution."
However, government prosecutions can constitute persecution
when they serve only as a pretext for politically motivated harassment. 1 17 In Ramirez-Rivas v. INS,118 the petitioner, who had never directly participated in any subversive activity against the El Salvadoran
government, based her claim of fear of persecution on her family
members' participation in the guerrilla movement and their subse107 See RESTATEMENT (TIaR)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 431(1), (3)

(1992);

see also

Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 622 (6th Cir. 1994) ("international law allows sovereign countries to protect themselves from criminals and revolutionaries").
108 Huan v. INS, 852 F. Supp. 460,467 (E.D. Va. 1994) (quoting El Balguiti v. INS, 5 F.3d
1135, 1136 (8th Cir. 1993)); accord Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 708 (10th Cir. 1991).
169 Perkovic, 33 F.3d at 621; see infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
110 See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
111 Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46, 47 (3d Cir. 1991).
112 Id.
113 Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 708 (10th Cir. 1991).

114 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990).
115 Id. at 305.
116 Id. at 312 (citing Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) and UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMIN-

167 (Geneva 1979)) [hereinafter U.N. HANDBOOK].
117 Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1990). Se infra notes 118-23 and
accompanying text.
118 899 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1990).
ING REFUGEE STATUS

N.C. J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. 20

quent incarceration as political prisoners. 119 The INS argued that because Ramirez's family members were legitimately being punished for
their opposition to the El Salvadoran government, any action taken
against petitioner upon return would not constitute persecution. The
INS reasoned that the slightest suspicion of a person's involvement in
criminal activity would legitimate any governmental response. 12 0 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that "whenever there is
no evidence of a legitimate, prosecutorial purpose for a government's
harassment of a'person or group, there arises a presumption that the
motive for the harassment is political."1 2 1 Therefore, punishment imposed without formal prosecutorial measures constitutes persecution
and not a legitimate government prosecution. 12 2 The court declared
that even prosecution of one who is guilty of criminal acts can still
constitute persecution on the basis of political opinion if the punish12 s
ment is excessive or arbitrary.
D.

The Effect of InternationalLaw

International law can also play an important role in distinguishing
between a legitimate prosecution as punishment for crimes that the
alien had committed in his home country and unreasonable prosecution that constitutes persecution under U.S. asylum law. 124 The courts
have applied this distinction in their determination of whether an
12 6
alien meets the "well-founded fear" standard.1 25 In Perkovic v. INS,
the Sixth Circuit reversed a BIA holding denying two Yugoslavian citizens' asylum claim. 1 27 The BIA concluded that petitioners' activities
promoting civil rights in Yugoslavia for ethnic Albanians violated Yugoslavian laws, and therefore the aliens did not establish themselves as
refugees. 128 The laws that the aliens violated prohibited "peaceful expression of dissenting political opinion ....
the exercise of citizens'
rights to petition their government, and the association of individuals
in political groups with objectives of which the [Yugoslav] government
does not approve. 12 9 The court recognized that international law's
deference to sovereign countries to protect themselves does not extend to permitting the prohibition and punishment of peaceful political expression and activity.' 30 Therefore, while the aliens' activities
119 Id. at 865.
120 Id. at 867-68.
121 Id. at 868.
122 Id.
123 Id.

124 See infra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
125 See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
126 33 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 1994).
127 Id. at 616.
128 Id. at 621-22.
129 Id. at 622.
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were considered political crimes in their homeland, they were protected under international human rights law. 13 ' Furthermore, the
1967 Protocol addresses the protection of aliens from punishment for
such activities13 2 and the Protocol is deemed to have been incorporated into U.S. law.1 33 Therefore, the court determined that because
"international law and the U.S. asylum statute explicitly seek to shelter
[petitioners'] activities, the BIA's construction . . . conflicts with the
34
statute and must be reversed."
International law pertinent to the Sadeghi asylum case deals with
issues of conscription and children. The recruitment of children
under the age of fifteen into the armed forces is prohibited by Article
38 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.1 35
These prohibitions against underage conscription have "attained the
status of customary international law.' 3 6 Indeed, Iran has been cited
by the United Nations as providing "one of the few recognized instances of a Protocol violation against children."13 7 In 1983, a special
report to the United Nations cited Iran's use of children as soldiers in
the war against Iraq. 138
E. The Burden of Proofin InternationalLaw
While the Immigration and Nationality Act specifically allocates
the responsibility for establishing prima facie eligibility for political asylum to the applicant, when foreign law becomes a factor the issue of
13 9
who has the burden of proof has been left to BIA interpretation.
131 Id.
132 Id. See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,

19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
133 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
134 Perkovic, 33 F.3d at 622.
135 Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 1994) (Kane, J., dissenting) (citing
Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. 1/44/736 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1457 (1989)). Article 38 states:
1) States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child. 2) States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure
that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct
part in the hostilities. 3) States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person
who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces .... 4) In
accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an
armed conflict.
Id. at 1146-47. (KaneJ., dissenting). Iran recently became one of the 166 nations to ratify
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Id. at 1147. (KaneJ., dissenting).
136 Id. (Kane, J., dissenting).
137 Colleen C. Maher, Note, The Protectionof Children in Armed Conflict: A Human Rights
Analysis of the Protection Afforded to Children in Welfare, 9 B.C. THrRD WoRuD L.J. 297, 315
(1989).
138

Id.

139

8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1994).

See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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The BIA first addressed this issue in Matter of Annang140 in 1973. The
BIA concluded that "the law of a foreign country is a question of fact
which must be proved by the petitioner if he relies on it to establish
eligibility for an immigration benefit." 14 1 The BIA recently developed
this burden of proof standard in Matter of Soleimani. 42 In that case, the
BIA reversed the decision of the immigration judge, which relied on
Israel's Law of Return to deny a Jewish Iranian's asylum application. 143
The BIA noted that except for a "perfunctory reference to its existence," the immigration judge had failed to address the Israeli law. 144
The BIA determined that the lack of evidence as to the petitioner's
eligibility or "the extent of the restrictions or conditions that may be
placed on offers of resettlement under that law" precluded the INS
from relying on the issue of resettlement as a basis to deny the petitioner's asylum claim.1 4 5 The BIA therefore held that "foreign law is a
46
matter to be proven by the party seeking to rely on it."1
IV. The Significance of the Case
A.

Deference Misplaced

By affirming the BIA's denial of asylum, the Sadeghi court leads the
Supreme Court's vision of case-by-case clarification of the "wellfounded fear" test into murky waters. The Tenth Circuit relies on the
substantial evidence standard of review to uphold the BIA's finding
that Sadeghi did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution for
purposes of asylum. 147 The majority's use of the substantial evidence
standard of review, however, ignores a key component of that standard-the reasonableness of the BIA's findings.1 4 8 Closer scrutiny of
the BIA decision reveals that it is based on erroneous or unsubstantiated factual findings and legal interpretations.
The majority opinion bases its decision to affirm the denial of
Sadeghi's asylum application on its deference to the BIA's holding that
the Iranian government sought Sadeghi for purposes of a legitimate
criminal prosecution rather than for persecution.1 4 9 The majority
does endeavor to analyze the issue, but its analysis is conclusory. The
140 Matter of Annang, 14 I. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1973).
141 Id. at 503.
142 Int. Dec. 3118 (BIA 1989).

143 Id. Israel's Law of Return represents an outstanding offer of permanent residence or
citizenship to all Jews who arrive in Israel. Id. An alien's firm resettlement in another country is"a factor to be evaluated in determining whether asylum should be granted as a matter
of discretion .. " Id.
144 Id.

145 Id.
146 Id

147 Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1994).
148 See Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 707 (10th Cir. 1991) (Under the substantial evidence
standard, the court will not reverse if the Board's conclusions "are supported by substantial
evidence and are substantiall reasonable."). Id. (emphasis added).
149 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1143.
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court declares the substantial evidence standard to be satisfied because
the BIA "reasonably could have inferred [that counseling against conscription] was illegal in Iran." 150 The dissenting opinion demonstrates
how such an inference regarding Iranian laws relies on several, unsupported assumptions:
First, the BIA assumed Iran has a conscription law mandating that a
fourteen-year-old serve in the Iranian army. The second assumption is
that Iran has a law which makes it a criminal offense to counsel a fourteen-year-old not to serve in the army. The third assumption is that we
recognize every law, even one that forces children to act as mine
sweepers or one that punishes a person who'counsels a child to refrain
from doing so. There
has been no evidence produced in support of
15 1
these assumptions.

The BIA's inference also relies on the "presuppositionless conclusion
that Iran's governmental forces attempt to limit arrests to the bounds
of legitimacy."1 52 The dissent declares that "[s]uch statements at best
53
are aspirational, not rational."'
Furthermore, the Sadeghi case is distinguishable from those cases
that have reaffirmed the principle that legitimate prosecution does not
constitute persecution for asylum purposes. 54 In all of those cases,
the alien raised the issue of his prosecution or conviction, and the punishment he would receive if returned, as a specific example of persecution in order to meet the objective part of the "well-founded fear"
standard. 155 'The court in each case determined that the petitioner

could not rely on government prosecution as evidence of a "wellfounded fear" of persecution because each petitioner had in fact definitively violated a legitimate law in their home country. 156 Sadeghi
1 57
never relied on a fear of prosecution as a basis for his asylum claim.
The evidence regarding Sadeghi's attempted arrest was presented to
meet the requirement that he was subject to individualized persecu-

tion. 158 Sadeghi made no mention of any prosecution by the Iranian
150 Id. at 1142.

151 Id. at 1145 (Kane, J., dissenting). The immigration judge noted that this incident
occurred "during the period of time when the Iranian authorities were using their people,
particularly the younger citizens, to clear mine fields with their bodies and sacrificing [sic]
themselves." Id. at 1145 n.2 (Kane,J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 1146 (KaneJ., dissenting).
153 Id.(KaneJ., dissenting).
154 See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
155 SeeJanusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1991) (alien contended that he would be
prosecuted for bribing a passport official if returned to his country); MA v. INS, 899 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (basis of the petitioner's asylum claim was that he failed to
comply with his country's conscription laws); Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998 (9th Cir.
1988) (part of alien's evidence of persecution by the government included his country's enforcement of a law requiring citizens to carry identification cards).
156 See Rodrigue2-Rvera, 848 F.2d 998.
157 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1141-42, 1144-45.
158 Id. at 1141. Showing that one has been directly threatened and "singled out" by the
persecutor is a basis for meeting the objective component of the "well-founded fear" standard of asylum. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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government. 159 Furthermore, there was no evidence that any formal,
160
criminal prosecution had in fact been initiated against Sadeghi.
Rather, it was the INS that introduced the contention that the incident
of the attempted arrest of Sadeghi could have constituted a prosecu16 1
tion for illegal activity and a fair administration of Iranian law.
B. Deference Denied: The Court Rjects the Soleimani Standard
The Sadeghi court's strong adherence to the principle of deference to BIA decisions wavers when the majority rejects BIA precedent
in order to support its favorable evaluation of the BIA's assumptions
regarding Iranian law. 162 Matter of Soleimani allocated the burden of
proof of foreign law to the party who relies on it.163 The BIA decision
in Soleimani placed the affirmative duty on the party that utilized foreign law to support their case. 164 Therefore, because it is the INS's
contention that Sadeghi fears prosecution for an allegedly illegal act,
counseling against army service, Soleimani would place the burden of
1 65
proof on the INS.
According to the rules of statutory construction imposed by the
Supreme Court in Chevron, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of an agency." 166 The majority in Sadeghi makes
no inquiry into the reasonableness of the BIA's construction of the
burden of proof of foreign law. 167 Judge Tacha states that because the
Refugee Act of 1980 requires the alien to carry "the burden of proof
[that he is a refugee], he [also] had the burden of proving that the
Iranian government sought him for purposes of persecution, rather
than for the legitimate purpose of criminal prosecution." 168 The majority then summarily rejects Soleimani, claiming that it would "impermissibly shift the petitioner's burden of proving a well-founded fear of
persecution to the INS to disprove the claim."' 69 This conclusion is
irrational. First of all, the INS raised the prosecution issue for the spe159 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1141.
160 Id. at 1146. See Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1988). In Blanco-

Lopez, the court rejected an INS argument that Salvadoran police apprehended Blanco-Lopez
to investigate criminal charges, which therefore fell under the country's right to prosecute
individuals accused of criminal activity. Id. The court declared that there was no evidence
"that an actual, legitimate, criminal prosecution was initiated against Blanco-Lopez." Id.
161 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1142.
162 Id. at 1143.
163 Matter of Soleimani, Int. Dec. 5118, at 10-11 (BIA 1989); see supra notes 142-46 and
accompanying text.
164 See Soleimani, Int. Dec. 3118 at 10-11.
165 See Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1143.
166 Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
167 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1143.
168 Id.
169

Id.
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cific purpose of disproving Sadeghi's evidence of persecution. 170
Sadeghi still retains the statutory burden of proving a well-founded
fear of persecution.17 1 Even if the INS assumptions on Iranian law
were true, requiring Sadeghi to prove foreign law upon which the INS
relies forces him to anticipate INS rebuttal arguments and prove "not
1 72
only his own contentions but those of the INS.
Moreover, because Sadeghi can meet that evidentiary burden
through only his own credible testimony, it would be unreasonable for
the INS to require Sadeghi to continue beyond that point and prove
issues of the case that he never relied upon and that actually work to
negate the evidentiary standards of proof of persecution that he has
already met. Aliens do not have to provide information that will incriminate them during deportation proceedings, 173 in which the INS
carries the burden of proof.174 Therefore, Sadeghi should be afforded
the same protection in asylum claims, for those issues where the INS
175
would carry the burden of proof.
Furthermore, the majority's refusal to place the burden of proof
on the INS implies that it is not normal to do so. On the contrary,
while the alien retains the primary burden of establishing refugee status, the INS has the burden of proof concerning affirmative defenses
that it raises. 176 For example, the INS may rebut an alien's persecution
claim by showing a change in circumstances in the alien's home country that do not warrant a future fear of persecution.' 77 The INS bears
the burden to show these changed conditions.178 Therefore, it is not
unreasonable to require the INS to prove foreign law that it raises as a
defense to an alien's claim of persecution.
Furthermore, the majority's rejection of the Soleimani standard
would return the state of BIA legal interpretation to the Annang standard, which places the burden of proof of foreign law on the applicant
only when "he relies on it."'1 79 Since Sadeghi did not rely on foreign

law, neither statutory law nor BIA precedent would address the issue in
this case. Given the deference accorded rational agency interpretations and the "long-standing principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien,"180 it is
170 Id.

171 Id. at 1146 (KaneJ., dissenting).
172 Id. (Kane, J., dissenting).
173 Jack Wasserman, PracticalAspects of Representing an Alien at a Deportation Hearing, 14
SAN DIEGO L. RaV. 111, 120 (1976).
174 Woodby v. INS, 384 U.S. 904 (1966).
175 See supra notes 163-74, infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
176 See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
177 Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 705 (10th Cir. 1991).
178 Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 619 (2d Cir. 1993); accord Kapcia, 944 F.2d at 705.
179 Matter of Annang, 14 I. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1973).
180 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
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unreasonable for Sadeghi to be penalized for failing to meet a burden
of proof that he had no affirmative duty to meet.
C. Conflicts with InternationalLaw
Even if the majority had upheld the Soleimani standard and the
INS successfully proved that Iranian law mandates fourteen-year-old
conscription and prohibits counseling against such military service, the
court's denial of asylum remains dubious under international law. In
the same year as Sadeghi's encounter with Iranian authorities at his
school, Iran was condemned by the United Nations for violating the
U.N. Protocol and customary international law regarding the use of
children in combat.18 1 The immigration judge acknowledged that
Sadeghi's incidents occurred "during the period of time when the Iranian authorities were using their people, particularly the younger citizens, to clear the mine fields with their bodies and sacrificing
82
themselves.'1
Similar to the Perkovic case, Sadeghi's advice to his student represented a peaceful political expression. 183 Even if his act was considered to be a crime in Iran, it was protected under international human
rights law, which prohibits the recruitment of children under the age
of fifteen into the military.' 84 "Therefore, even assuming the existence
of the supposed Iranian laws, to recognize prosecution thereunder as a
legitimate exercise of governmental authority would conflict with funboth the Geneva Convention and cusdamental human rights under
1 85
tomary international law."
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Perkovic is not the only appellate
court precedent to support the Sadeghi dissent's position that asylum
should not be denied when the actions of the alien's home government violate international law. The Fourth Circuit, in M.A. v. INS, recognized one exception to the rule that governmental penalties
enforcing conscription are not considered to be persecution. 186 That
exception allows an alien to be considered eligible for asylum when
"the alien would be associated with a military whose acts are condemned by the international community as contrary to the basic rules
of human conduct. 18 7 The BIA's assumption that Iranian conscription laws include a prohibition against counseling against military ser181 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
182 Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1145 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994).
183 See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.

185 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1147 (Kane, J., dissenting).
186 MA. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
187 Id. at 312. (quoting U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 116,1 171 (1979)). The U.N. HANDBOOK recommends granting refugee status upon a showing that the alien's conscription
would associate him with a military that has been condemned by the international community. Id. Although the U.N. HANDBOOK does not carry binding force of law, it does provide
"significant guidance in construing the [1967] Protocol," to which Congress sought to con-
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vice logically allows the M.A. exception to extend to an alien who
counsels another against enlistment. Therefore, in the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits, Sadeghi would be eligible for asylum for counseling his
fourteen-year-old student not to join the Iranian military, which has in
fact been cited for violating international law. Indeed, the United Nations actually recommends refugee status in such a situation.' 88
D. The Sadeghi Court's Restrictive Interpretation of Persecution
The Sadeghi court seems to "ignor[e] the very purpose, of our immigration laws"18 9 in fear that accepting the alien's claim for asylum
based on a well-founded fear of persecution "would transform the
political asylum process... into a vehicle for foreign policy debates in
the courts .....

"190

However, courts have reversed BIA decisions that

restrictively interpreted the refugee requirements as contravening the
language and intent of the statute.' 9 ' In Osorio v. INS, the Second Circuit reversed a BIA decision that held that the alien's leadership of a
labor union constituted an "economic" dispute between the alien and
his home country, and therefore his fear of persecution was not premised on any enumerated ground.' 92 The court criticized the BIA for
assuming that a dispute, properly characterized as economic, could
not also be characterized as political.' 93 The alien is not required to
show that his persecutors were motivated only by one of the enumerated reasons of the Act. 194 Rather, thealien is only required to show
that one of the enumerated factors, such as political opinion, was one
of the reasons for his persecution.' 95 Therefore, the Second Circuit
held that the BIA's dismissal of the underlying political motives of
Osorio's persecutors as irrelevant unreasonably restricted the defini96
tion of "political opinion" under the Act.'
Similarly, the Sadeghi court's-restrictive definition of "well-founded
fear of persecution" is also unreasonable. In an Islamic Republic like
Iran, "in which 'religion is almost inseparable from government,' -97
Sadeghi's anti-Islamic views reflect inherently political beliefs that serve
as motives for government persecution. Sadeghi presents additional
form in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 480 U.S. 421,
436 (1987).
188 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
189 Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 1994) (Kane,J., dissenting).
190 MA. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 313-14 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
191 Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 622 n.6 (6th Cir. 1994); accord Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d
1017, 1028-31 (2d Cir. 1994); Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989).
192 Osorio, 18 F.3d at 1029.
193 Id.

194 Id.; accord Singh v. lichert, No. C-93-1680 MHP, 1993 WL 483188, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 12, 1993).
195 Osorio, 18 F.3d at 1028.
196 Id. at 1030-31.
197 Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 341 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1992 (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1993)).
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evidence that demonstrates strong grounds to find the Iranian government's attempted arrest to be politically motivated. Not only was he a
member of an antigovernment group, and anti-Islamic, but Sadeghi
also counseled a youth not to follow Islamic teachings in a country
dominated by Islamic principles. The Iranian authorities specifically
stated that they wanted to arrest Sadeghi "because he was against the
government and the Islamic revolution."19 8 "One cannot have a more
compelling example of a political opinion generating political persecution than the opinion that is held by a subversive in opposition to the
government." 199
Furthermore, "documentary evidence establishing past persecution or threat of future persecution is usually sufficient to satisfy the
20 0
objective component of the well-founded fear standard."
In Aguilera-Cota,direct corroborative evidence was not necessary to
establish asylum eligibility, and the petitioner's testimony regarding a
threatening note and a suspicious visit by a stranger was sufficient to
constitute a "well-founded fear of persecution." 20 1 Sadeghi did provide direct corroborative evidence to substantiate his testimony of individualized persecution.20 2 Therefore, when combined with the
immigration judge's affirmative finding of credibility, Sadeghi's evidence of his well-founded fear of persecution surpassed the level
found sufficient by the Ninth Circuit in Aguilera-Cota
Judge Tacha's majority opinion does not focus on how Sadeghi's
specific, factual evidence of his fear of persecution relates to the objective and subjective components of the well-founded fear standard. Instead, the majority rejects Sadeghi's persecution claim by relying on
unsubstantiated BIA assumptions regarding the legality of Sadeghi's
activities, supported by an arbitrary rejection of the BIA's prior allocation of the burden of proof. However, the majority's denial of asylum
based on a "legitimate" prosecution is conclusory. First, under international law, prosecution for counseling a youth against military service is
not "legitimate."2 0 3 There was also no evidence of any formal prosecution against Sadeghi.2 0 4 When a government "punishes someone without undertaking any formal prosecutorial measures and acts with a
political motive, or there are grounds to presume such a motive, it
engages in persecution, not legitimate prosecution."2 0 5 The Ninth Circuit has declared that a BIA finding that an arrest is not politically
198 Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 1994) (Kane,J., dissenting).
199 Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
200 Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing INS v. CardozaFonseca, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
201 Id.
202 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1144.
203 See supra notes 124-38, 181-88 and accompanying text.
204 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1145.
205 Singh v. Ilchert, No. C-93-1680 MHP, 1993 WL 483188, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
1993); accord Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1990).
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motivated is "highly dubious" when there is no evidence demonstrating legitimate detention.2 0 6 There is no evidence that the attempted
arrest of Sadeghi represented a "legitimate detention" and given Iran's
track record in the area of human rights, the BIA's conclusion that
Iran was simply fairly administering a law, is unwarranted.
E.

The BIA's Credibility Holding

The BIA did nothing to redeem its credibility in its alternative
ground for denying Sadeghi asylum. The BIA found weaknesses in the
testimony of Sadeghi and his two witnesses, and therefore concluded
that Sadeghi had failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. 20 7 This finding directly contradicted the immigration judge's
evaluation of Sadeghi's testimony as credible. 208 "Because the immigration judge is in the best position to evaluate an alien's testimony,
his or her credibility determinations are to be given 'much
weight.' "209 The BIA also reviews the immigration judge's credibility
findings under the substantial evidence standard.2 10 In this case, the
immigration judge "cut short Sadeghi's presentation of his case at various intervals, indicating his satisfaction with the credibility of Sadeghi
and his witnesses." 21 .The judge also prevented Sadeghi from calling
other witnesses with corroborating testimony.2 1 2 The immigration
judge even stated in his oral decision that he had been impressed with
Sadeghi's testimony.2 1 3 However, the BIA noted weakness in Sadeghi's
testimony based on discrepancies that it claimed were "not explained."2 1 4 To condemn Sadeghi for discrepancies in testimony that
he was prevented from clarifying through corroborative witnesses, because the hearing officer was sufficiently persuaded on the issue, is
clearly unreasonable and even implicates a procedural due process
2 15
violation.

The Sadeghi court did not address this second BIA holding, finding sufficient reason to deny Sadeghi asylum in the BIA's distinction
between persecution and prosecution.2 1 6 However, the two grounds
are not mutually exclusive. The alternative holding on Sadeghi's wit206 Singh, 1993 WL 483188 at *5.
207 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1143.

208 Id. at 1141-42.
209 Estrada v. INS, 775 F,2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Phinpathya v. INS, 673

F.2d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)).
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id.

Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1147.
Id.
Id.

Id. (citing Cert. Admin R. at 6-7).
Id. at 1148 (Kane, J., dissenting). See Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 705 (10th Cir.
1994) ("[P]etitioners in deportation proceedings must be 'afforded a full and fair hearing
that comports with due process.' " (quoting Vissian v. INS, 548 F.2d 325, 329 (10th Cir.
1977))). See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
216 Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1143.
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ness credibility colors the BIA's primary finding, that Sadeghi failed to
establish a well-founded fear of persecution, as even more precarious.
"[W] here, as here, the BIA and IJ [Immigration Judge] disagree on a
factual question, especially one involving a credibility determination,
the appellate court should give substantial weight to the IJ's finding of
the facts."2 17 The court's failure is highlighted by the fact that the
alien's testimony alone can be sufficient to establish asylum
2 18
eligibility.
V.

Conclusion

Sadeghi v. INS represents the ambiguous state of the courts of appeals' case-by-case interpretation of "well-founded fear of persecution."
The inconsistent application of the "well-founded fear" standard between the circuits turns the asylum process into a game of venue roulette, where the interpretation of federal law depends on the circuit in
which the asylum claim is heard. While the substantial evidence standard of review does create a strong presumption in favor of factual
findings and legal interpretations by the BIA, the Sadeghi case seems to
give license to the application of that standard of review in an unreasonable manner. Furthermore, Judge Tacha's failure to address the
conflicting and unsubstantiated bases for the BIA's decision renders
the majority opinion analytically weak. The majority's high regard for
BIA precedent then falls flat when it proves inconvenient.
The effect of such arbitrary deference to the BIA is to make the
interpretation of U.S. immigration laws subject to the whim of the BIA
and the courts. The Supreme Court's decision to leave it to the lower
courts to define what constitutes a "well-founded fear of persecution"
fails when courts blindly defer to BIA legal and factual holdings which
amount to unjustified violations of U.S. and international law. The
Supreme Court's purpose was to provide immigration laws with the
flexibility necessary to a case-by-case analysis.2 19 Therefore, a concrete
definition of "well-founded fear" would prove too rigid. However, the
Supreme Court needs to provide some illumination to the asylum standards in order to live up to our national and international obligations
under the 1980 Refugee Act and the U.N. Protocol. The ones who
suffer when the courts take short cuts in asylum proceedings are the
very ones the Refugee Act of 1980 intended to help, clearly endangering the safety and even the lives of individuals subject to persecution
abroad.
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217 Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Universal Camera
Corp v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)).
218 See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
219 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).

